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SUMMARY 
 
The feasibility of unmanned, autonomous merchant vessels is investigated by the EU project MUNIN (Maritime 
Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks). The ships will be manned while departing and entering port 
and unmanned during ocean-passage. When unmanned, the ships will be controlled by an automatic system informed by 
onboard sensors allowing the ship to make standard collision avoidance manoeuvres according to international 
regulation. The ship will be continuously monitored by a remote shore centre able to take remote control should the 
automatic systems falter. For the humans in the shore control centre the usual problems of automations remains as well 
as a pronounced problem of keeping up adequate situation awareness through remote sensing. The big challenge for the 
project will be to show that an unmanned system is at least as safe as an manned ship system, and to provide the shore 
control operators with adequate situation awareness. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Maritime Unmanned Ship through Intelligence in 
Networks, abbreviated MUNIN, is the name of a three 
year EU, 7th Framework research project started in 2012. 
The aim of the project is to set a 200 m long dry cargo 
vessel under unmanned and autonomous control from 
pilot drop-off to pilot pick-up point. In this project a 
simulated conventional vessel will be retrofitted with 
technology required for an unmanned trans-oceanic 
voyage. The project consortium consists of 8 research 
and industry partners from 5 European countries: 
Fraunhofer Center for Maritime Logistics and Services, 
CML, in Hamburg, Germany; Marine Technology 
Research Institute, MARINTEK, in Trondheim, Norway; 
the Maritime Human Factors group at Chalmers 
University of Technology in Gothenburg, Sweden; The 
Department of Maritime Studies at Hochschule Wismar 
in Rostock-Warnemünde, Germany; Aptomar AS, 
Trondheim, Norway; MarineSoft Entwicklungs- und 
Logistik-gesellschaft mbH in Rostock-Warnemünde, 
Germany, Marorka ehf in Reykjavik, Iceland, and the 
Faculty of Law at University College Cork, Ireland. 
 
An overview of the different technical research areas are 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: A schematic drawing of the features of the MUNIN project. To the left the unmanned ship with its 
Autonomous Ship Controller and engine system, and the IR and daylight gyro stabilised video system that had detected a 
stand on vessel and is preparing to do an evasive manoeuvre. The ship is remotely monitored by the operators of the 
Shore Control Centre to the far right. In case of emergency they have the possibility of taking remote control of the ship. 
Also the approaching pilot boat with pilot and boarding crew can take remote control of the vessel. Image by the 
MUNIN project.  
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1.1 WHY UNMANNED SHIPS? 
 
One may wonder what drives an investigation of the 
feasibility of unmanned ships. Four reasons are presented 
here: the human work environment onboard and a risk of 
future shortage of seafarers; the strive for reducing costs 
of transportation; the global need of reducing emissions, 
and a strive for increased safety in shipping. 
 
1.1 (a) Work environment 
 
In a recent blog a consultant at a major shipping 
company revealed his listing of the three, in his opinion, 
biggest threats for the company in the coming five to 
fifteen years. As number one came “the unattractive 
industry”. His doubt was wheatear the shipping industry 
would be able to attract the generation Y, the millennials 
those born between the early 80s and the early 00s [1]. In 
a report to the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) in 2010 the Baltic and International Maritime 
Council (BIMCO) and the International Shipping 
Federation (ISF) reported that “our results indicate that 
the industry will most probably face a tightening labour 
market, with recurrent shortages for officers, particularly 
as shipping markets recover” [2]. At the maritime college 
at the department of Shipping and Marine Technology at 
Chalmers University of Technology we have indications 
that the time newly examined master mariners expect to 
stay at sea is shrinking. Is it that the idea of being 
confined in relative isolation in a steel box for months 
together with a decreasing number of maybe culturally 
heterogenic crew is not so attractive for the younger 
generations of seafarers? Before the recession in 2009 
the shipping industry experienced a problematic shortage 
of trained officers. Due to the recent economic recession 
this is not so now, but what will happen as the economy 
recovers? It could be that unmanned ships (or few-
manned ships supported with autonomous technology) 
might be necessary in the future if we want to keep 
trading.  
 
1.1 (b) Cost reduction  
 
The shipping industry has for decades reduced costs by 
cutting down on the size of ship’s crews, this in turn 
leading to stress, safety issues and less attractive working 
conditions. Automation is a major driver in most 
industries, replacing manpower with machines. On the 
individual level this might be a painful, but on the 
general level it mostly means improved economic 
conditions for the society as a whole. One of the 
challenges for the MUNIN project is to show cost 
efficiency for an unmanned ship system. 
 
1.1 (c) Reduction of emissions 
 
EU has promised to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
80 % to 2050 [3]. Findings summarised by United 
Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [4] 
also indicate an urgent need to reduce the emissions of 
greenhouse gases. One way of reducing the footprint of 
the shipping industry is to apply slow steaming. By 
reducing the speed of a typical container vessel by 30 %, 
a 50 % reduction in fuel consumption and thereby also 
fuel costs and emissions can be achieved [5]. However, if 
ships go slower, more ships will be needed to keep up the 
transportation capacity. And these ships will need fuel, 
so the equation is more complex than that. But according 
to the calculations for container shipping by Pierre 
Cariou [5] slow steaming has the potential of reducing 
emissions by around 11%, taken the increased number of 
ships into account. This is close to the target of a 15% 
reduction by 2018 that was proposed by the International 
Maritime Organisation’s Marine Environment Protection 
Committee, 2009 [6]. 
 
But slower ships mean longer voyages with increased 
salary costs as well as socially less attractive extended 
stays onboard. 
 
1.1 (d) Increased safety 
 
According to many reports human error is involved in 
65-96 % of all accidents at sea, e.g. [7], [8],[9]. Could it 
be that by removing the human from the direct control of 
the ship, accidents to some extent can be prevented? 
"The big benefit of having a driverless system is the 
safety - the element of human error is taken out 
completely," said Copenhagen unmanned Metro chief 
executive Piero Marotta in an interview 2009 [10]. Given 
some time, it remains to be seen if this is right for the 
Copenhagen metro. However, it is probably not so 
simple. Humans still program automation. For example 
in 1999 NASA’s Mars Climate Orbiter disintegrated 
entering the March atmosphere due to a simple 
programming error (software giving instruction in 
Imperial units while the orbiter expected instructions in 
SI units) [11]. And human will still be involved in 
monitoring, remote control, and maintenance. And on the 
high seas unmanned ships will have to coexist with 
manned systems. But if we ever so slightly can move 
decisions from the operator onboard, where stress and 
fatigue play a vital part, to less stressful programming 
and maintenance work, some safety benefit might be 
gained. It is one of the major goals of the MUNIN 
project to show that an unmanned system can be at least 
as safe as a manned system.  
 
More on this later, as this discussion will be the focus of 
this paper. But first a brief look at the unmanned and 
autonomous system. 
 
1.2 UNMANNED AND AUTONOMOUS SHIPS 
 
An autonomous ship is a ship that is controlled by 
automatic systems both for navigation and for engine 
control. These systems will be preprogramed, just as we 
today can have a track pilot follow a pre-recorded voyage 
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plan. But the autonomous system will also contain a 
certain level of artificial intelligence and will be able to 
detect and identify other vessels and do collision 
avoidance manoeuvres according to the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGS). However, an autonomous ship is not 
necessarily unmanned. From time to time maintenance 
teams might be onboard during parts of the voyage to 
make service or repairs on systems onboard, and as 
mentioned above, the ship is expected to be manned 
during port approach and departure. 
 
An unmanned ship is, as the name implies, a ship with no 
one onboard. It is expected that the vessels will be 
unmanned for the trans-oceanic phase of a voyage. 
However, an unmanned ship is not necessarily 
autonomous. The vessels will be remotely monitored 
from a Shore Control Centre (SCC) receiving crucial 
information via satellite with short time intervals (once 
every 4 seconds is envisioned) and the SCC will have the 
ability to take remote control if called for, or if in doubt 
of the autonomous system. 
 
Reliable communication systems will be a challenge for 
the system and as a last resort if the autonomous system 
cannot find a solution with concurrent loss of 
communication the ship will be able to go into a fail-to-
safe mode (e.g. drop anchor or heave-to, as applicable). 
For more details on the architecture of the systems and 
technical details see [12], and [13]. 
 
Many of the technical systems developed in this project 
might also be used to enhance safety in manned vessels.  
 
This paper will now focus on the human factors issues 
concerning monitoring and control of the unmanned 
vessel from the Shore Control Centre. 
 
1.3 THE SHORE CONTROL CENTRE 
 
The vision is that a fleet of unmanned vessels will be 
continuously monitored from a control centre. The 
operators will be notified when threshold limits are 
passed, for instance, if the ship leaves its predefined path 
and time schedule, or if the onboard sensor systems pick 
up an object that cannot be identified. In the case that 
intervention is needed this can be done in three levels: 
 
1. Indirect control. By updating the voyage plan 
during voyage, e.g. regular updates due to 
weather routing, or to avoid a declared NoGo 
zone, e.g. an oil spill operation. The 
autonomous system is still in control. 
 
2. Direct control. By ordering a specific 
manoeuvre to the vessel, e.g. heaving to give lee 
for a search and rescue operation. The 
autonomous system is still in control. 
 
3. Situation handling. In this case the autonomous 
system is bypassed. The shore based Officer Of 
the Watch controls rudder and thrusters directly. 
This will be done form a “situation room” 
looking much like a present full mission bridge 
simulator on a maritime achademy. 
 
A great challenge for the project will be to determine 
precisely what information is needed, and how to portray 
this information in the Shore Control Centre to give the 
operators enough situation awareness to be able to, in 
worst cases, apply direct control of the remote vessel. 
 
2.           THEORY 
 
On the manned ship bridge officers constantly work on 
building their situation awareness. The term was coined 
by Mika Endsley in 1988 [14] and is defined as “The 
perception of elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future”.  Perceiving, comprehending and projecting. On 
the bridge this is done by monitoring instruments like 
radar and electronic chart system, but also by looking for 
cues outside of the windows and by sensing the vessels 
motions and vibrations. Prison 2013 used the term ship 
sense to describe the knowledge of the bridge officer in 
shiphandling [15], [16].   
 
2.1 SHIP SENSE 
 
The skill of ship sense contains so much more than 
collecting and making use of information presented by 
the navigational instruments. In close distances to other 
objects, such as when navigating through an archipelago 
or when engaged in harbour manoeuvres, i.e. situations 
when there are many available objects that can be used as 
reference objects, the task is mainly visual. Making use 
of information collected from the outside environment.  
 
But focusing on the trans-oceanic phase of a voyage, this 
is usually a phase when the work of the navigational 
crew takes the form of a more monitoring state. Because 
the lack of visual reference objects, it is also the part of 
the voyage where mainly information from the nautical 
instruments is used as sources for achieving situational 
knowledge. But when the weather gets rough and the 
sea-state high, this is also when the situation on the 
bridge is transformed from being largely a monitoring 
job to being a very active task [15]. The autopilot is often 
disengaged and the ship is steered by hand with the goal 
to get a smoother ride through the seas. In such a 
situation the job of the shiphandler is about, among many 
other things, to get a feel for the ship’s movement in the 
present sea state. To know when it is time to slow down 
or to slightly alter course in relation to the direction of 
the oncoming waves to better care for the safety of the 
ship, its cargo and its crew.  
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This situational knowledge is not something that is 
collected through information presented by the nautical 
instruments onboard. It is rather something that is gained 
by the shiphandler using his senses, i.e. feeling the 
heaving motions of the vessel in the sea state, listening to 
and feeling the slamming when the bow falls into the 
through after being raised high by the last passing wave, 
and by visually studying the wave patterns [16]. 
 
The shiphandler can as a result of the above be pictured 
as balancing the task prerequisites and the resulting 
environmental factors.  By letting his ship sense and his 
knowledge of the ships manoeuvring characteristics 
activate manoeuvring actions to reach the overarching 
goal of a safe voyage for both his ship, its crew and its 
cargo – to keep the ship in harmony with its environment 
[16]. 
 
2.2 HUMAN FACTORS 
 
Human factors is a scientific discipline concerned with 
the understanding of the interactions among human and 
the other elements of the system, and the profession that 
applies theory, principles, data and methods to design in 
order to optimize human well-being and overall system 
performance [17]. In the social technical model “The 
Septigon Model” [18] which was developed from “The 
SHEL Model” [19][20], there are seven interrelated 
elements that made up one sociotechnical system: 
Individual, Group, Organizational Environment, Society 
and Culture, Practice, Physical Environment, Technology.  
 
The targeted goal of such models is always aiming at 
reaching the harmonious state between the people and 
the environment. For manned ships, the interactive 
harmony between people and environment as well as 
people and the vessel (both software and hardware), 
depends on what level of situation awareness one can 
achieve during manoeuvring, as these effects make up 
the gut feeling described earlier as ship sense.  
 
In essence, perception and cognition are the keys in ship 
sense from the perspective of human factors. When 
fulfilling the task of manoeuvring, the information is 
gathered through seafarers’ senses via different 
perception receptors like the retina, which represents the 
first level of situation awareness. Then the seafarer goes 
through his/her experience and knowledge to 
comprehend the situation at hand, and finally uses mental 
models to judge what information is more crucial than 
other information.  
 
Although it is true that the limit of human perception and 
attention constrain how good situation awareness can 
become, it is almost impossible to miss some information 
when people and the vessel share the same spatial 
movement, e.g. information brought by kinetic 
perceptions. Slamming will induce the high load to the 
ship and is therefore treated as the one important factor 
during risk assessment. Besides, the auditory receptors 
which will either actively or passively receive the sound 
of the strong wind while the visual image of the sea rage 
and foam is hard to miss if one just keeps his or her eyes 
open. However, by introducing the concept of unmanned 
ships, maintaining a high-level of situation awareness 
will be a big challenge. The factors causing ship sense 
onboard needs to be relocated to the shore side for an 
unmanned ship system.  
 
First of all, there will be no physical connection between 
the human and the vessel, and no directly perceived 
information from the ship’s environment. Specifically the 
visual perception of the environment, a vital sense in 
ship-handling for bridge crews, will be lost. This missing 
interaction highlights several human factor issues 
concerning both monitoring and controlling, e.g., it will 
be difficult for the operators in the Shore Control Center 
to perceive how the ship is behaving thousands of miles 
away, and what surrounding environment the vessel is 
facing at that moment. One solution is to build the 
connection between ship and shore by collecting and 
delivering dynamic information related to safety and 
navigation to shore. However it does not necessarily 
resolve the issue regarding the effect of absorbing 
information via different perceptions as the initial stage 
of situation awareness. 
 
Secondly, the intuitive mental model that is used for 
maneuvering manned ships is no longer available. 
Mental models are used to decide the priority of 
information for humans [21]. In the task of remote 
monitoring and controlling, the users on shore need to 
build a new mental model to take them into a higher level 
of awareness, otherwise they will become blind to the 
environment, let alone the actions that need to be taken. 
There is a need to make people on shore understand the 
information more intuitively by lowering the burden of 
constructing the full picture. It is necessary to transform 
the conventional “onboard mental model” to the one that 
applies to shore management scenarios. 
 
Thirdly, situation awareness is one accumulated product 
of the process [22] and therefore developing constantly. 
Although the data can be collected and delivered to shore 
instantaneously, the information acquired at one 
particular moment does not necessarily serve for high-
level situation awareness, for the user needs to recall the 
previous related information to understand the situation 
thoroughly. But constantly providing information might 
not be the solution because there will be a huge risk of 
information overloading. Admittedly it is plausible to 
deliver needed information for the coming task by task 
detection, the user might still fail to keep pace to the 
rapid changing system and fulfil multi-threaded tasks. 
Cost-effectiveness is one crucial aspect when relocating 
human factors from ship to shore. What is more, it is not 
only what information is indispensable but also how 
dynamic the situation is changing in situation awareness 
needs to be reconsidered for Shore Control Centre. 
Maintaining situation awareness is more challenging than 
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creating situation awareness for one moment since it is 
required to both keep track of the dynamic situation and 
keep users in the loop.    
 
Overall, unmanned ship does not mean elimination of 
human factors but on the contrary, more attention needs 
to be paid to human factors with respect to developing 
and maintaining high-level situation awareness in 
dynamic systems. By relocating the human factors from 
ship to shore and considering them as the core goals, it 
will help to identify what information as well as what 
interactive approaches are really needed to develop the 
usable shore-based system. 
 
3. METHOD AND RESULTS 
 
In order to find out what information that will be 
necessary at the Shore Control Centre in order to 
acquiring adequate situation awareness a focus group 
interview was organized with 6 bridge officers with 
experience from different types of vessels. 
 
The group came up with a list of 165 pieces of 
information that they felt was needed for providing 
situation awareness for a remote operator. The 
information was clustered into 9 different groups. Below 
are a summary of each information group. 
 
1. Voyage. Information regarding the voyage plan and 
the itinerary list of reporting points etc. Also control of 
the voyage envelop, setting of threshold parameters for 
alarms that will change during a voyage (e.g. minimum 
allowed depth, minimum allowed distance to other 
vessels, land etc.). Updates of ship’s static AIS message, 
fuel situation, etc. Daily updates from weather routing 
services will also be administered from this group. 
 
2. Sailing. In this group all the standard information seen 
on a ship bridge would go: position, course over ground, 
heading, rudder angle, rate of turn, speed over ground 
and through water, etc. Here the main sailing alarm 
“inside nav box” also goes. The vessels planned voyage 
is represented by a “safe haven”, a rectangle moving 
along the planned track. The box represents the expected 
position and time slot the ship is to be within if the 
voyage proceeds according to plan. If the ship for some 
reason leaves the box the operator is notified. 
 
3. Observations. In this group the important information 
from of the autonomous object identification system is 
reported. The onboard sensor system fuses information 
from radar, AIS and the daylight and IR video cameras 
into an object identification system which will identify 
other ships, their course, speed and attitude and send this 
to the autonomous ship controller which will act 
according to COLREGS. The situation is also shown on 
the chart system in the Shore Control Centre. If the 
system fails to identify an object the image is sent to 
shore for identification. The object identification system 
is developed by the partner Aptomar AS and is expected 
to detect objects at least as well as a human lookout, but 
with a 24/7 vigilance that probably exceeds human 
capabilities. Tests with this system will be dune during 
the spring of 2014. 
 
A challenge for the autonomous system as well as the 
remote operator will be the terms “restricted visibility” 
and “safe speed” which is not numerically defined in the 
COLREGS. In “restricted visibility” there is no stand-on 
ship (with right-of-way), but both ships are compelled to 
take evasive manoeuvre, while in “good” visibility the 
stand-on vessel is compelled to keep course and speed. 
  
In this group the navigators also requested information 
about the ships motions. With no one onboard to sense 
heave, roll and slamming, these motions would have to 
be monitored by sensors and sent to the shore centre and 
displayed in some intuitive way to give some ship sense 
to the operator. Maybe in some kind of ship’s equivalent 
to an airplane’s gyroscope (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. A flight gyroscope showing roll, and pitch. A 
proposed vessel gyroscope can be used to transmit some 
“ship sense” to the remote officer of the watch. 
 
The gyroscope would need to indicate average and peak 
roll and heave, but also vibrations dangerous to the hull’s 
structural integrity driving from slamming and taking 
green water on deck.  
 
4. Safety and emergencies. In this group information 
about firefighting, water ingress, bilge pumps, watertight 
doors, etc. is presented. Also handling of anchors, indoor 
PA systems to communicate with maintenance crews etc. 
 
5. Security. This group contains information of the 
security sensitive log-on to the ship (an unmanned vessel 
will be an attractive target for computer hackers). It will 
also contain logs of door status etc. allowing the operator 
to keep track of authorized personal onboard (e.g. 
maintenance team), but also of possible intruders or 
stowaways onboard that could compromise the ISPS 
(International Ship and Port Facility Security) integrity of 
the vessel. CCTV camera images from the ship can also 
be requested by the operator (e.g. engine room, pilot 
ladder, cargo holds as well as common indoor and deck 
spaces). 
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6. Cargo, stability and strength. In this group information 
about the autonomous stability system and lists of tank 
levels is presented. Manual ballast water handling is also 
managed from here. This group also contains information 
about cargo conditions. The target vessel for the MUNIN 
project is a dry bulk carrier so it is envisioned that 
monitoring of temperature, humidity and ventilation for 
all cargo holds will be important as well as displacement 
monitoring. 
 
7. Technical. In this group the engine parameters go. The 
engine is controlled by an onboard autonomous engine 
control system and when everything is working all right 
only a very limited amount of information is sent to 
shore. However the Shore Control Centre also include an 
engineer that can request and monitor all available 
parameters and control accessible points as well as plan 
maintenance and repair. 
 
8. Shore Control Centre. There are some things that the 
autonomous vessel will not be able to handle itself. One 
of them is voice communication with other vessels. 
Although an unmanned vessel will have to be clearly 
recognizable as such, maybe thought paining, special 
lights, special AIS designator, etc., the unmanned vessel 
will be obliged to listen and respond to all radio and 
distress channels just like a manned ship, but the 
incoming calls will have to be linked to the shore 
operator. The calculated lag will be the same as in a 
normal satellite call and could be handled. Navtex, 
navigational warnings, AIS text messages etc. will also 
be forwarded within this group. 
 
This group also contain information about the operational 
mode of the unmanned vessel. From the shore 
perspective the ship can be either in a) manual onboard, 
b) autonomous, c) remote, or d) fail-to-safe mode. 
Manual mode is when the ship is handled by the onboard 
control team or the pilot going from port to the point of 
autonomous voyage. Autonomous is when the ship is 
controlled by the autonomous onboard system. Remote 
control is when the ship is controlled from the Shore 
Control Centre and finally the Fail-to-safe mode is an 
emergency mode which the ship will go into after a 
certain time if communication with shore is lost or 
should some other emergencies happen. Fail-to-safe can 
mean different things sin different waters, e.g. drifting on 
the high seas, heave-to in constrained eaters, or drop 
anchor if close to leeward land. 
 
As communication costs using satellite link is as a very 
expensive service today the shore operator also need to 
keep track of not only available satellite links and 
bandwidth, but also communication costs. We estimate 
that costs can reach 150,000 US dollars per month with 
today’s prices, if real-time communication of all 
parameters were to be practiced. (However, 
communication costs are expected to fall in the future.) 
Therefore information will only be sent on need-to-know 
bases. 
 
For trust-building in initial stages of the unmanned 
system provisions for sending the event log of the 
autonomous ship controller can also be made. 
 
9. Administrative. An administrative group containing 
information that a ship needs to log was also identified, 
such as different log books and crew list, etc. VDR 
(Voyage Data Recorder) is one such type of information.  
 
Other exceptional situations difficult to tackle on 
unmanned ships, that was brought up during the focus 
group was such things as vessel icing (a not uncommon 
problem in Scandinavian waters winter time) and 
displacement of cargo. And maybe not to be 
underestimate: a plethora of small trivial problems like a 
dripping tap, a door not properly shut, a bin that has 
fallen over, that on a manned ships would be trivial to 
fix, but which on an unmanned vessel might grow to 
serious trouble. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
Although the autonomous vessel might be unmanned, 
humans will continue to play an important part in the 
unmanned ship system. And with humans comes the 
possibility errors. Issues identified include: 
 
1. Situation awareness in the SCC: mistakes due to not 
understanding the true situation of the vessel.  
2. Misunderstandings in interaction with manned vessels: 
lag in VHF communication, bad communication links, 
language issues same as for manned systems, but 
worsened by lack of situation awareness. (e.g. references 
to local conditions not known by SCC operator.) 
3. Delays in decision making due to lengthy time for 
operator to get into the loop (human-out-of-the-loop 
syndrome). 
4. Stress and information overload because several ships 
might need the operators attention at the same time. 
5. Human error due to “carry over effects” between two 
vessels as operator monitors several vessels at a time. 
6. Weather situations too difficult for the automation to 
cope with and video link not good enough to allow for 
proper ship sense for manual ship handling. 
 
This and other issues will be risk factors for an 
unmanned ship system. Let’s look at some of these 
issues. 
 
How can we expect operators thousands of miles from 
the actual vessel to be aware of the situation, to gain 
adequate situation awareness? Three tools are the main 
pillars in this respect: the electronic chart, the radar and 
the video image (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Three tools deliver the bulk of situation 
awareness to the remote operator: a camera system (top), 
radars (bottom left) and the electronic chart with AIS 
information and predicted maneuverability parameters 
(bottom right). 
 
The vessels position and the position of other vessels in 
the vicinity is constantly transmitted to the shore control 
and displayed on an electronic chart system (see Figure 
3, bottom right). On this system the vessels voyage plan 
(intended track, and intended time slot, the “navbox”) as 
well as manoeuvring envelope are also shown  
 
Under normal operation information from radars and AIS 
data is computed onboard by the object identification 
system. But on request radar images from the ships 
radars can be transmitted to the shore control (see Figure 
3, bottom left). 
 
One of the partners in the project, Aptomar AS, has 
developed a gyro stabilized camera platform equipped 
with IR and daylight video cameras and search light. 
This system conducts automatic image recognition and 
will do autonomous watch keeping. The camera platform 
can also be remote controlled from the shore centre 
sending stills or video images with a quality depending 
on the available connection link. Test with remote 
controlled manoeuvring of the vessel using the video 
system is planned for later this year. One of the real big 
challenges: remote hand steering in heavy weather would 
be the optimal goal of such a test but will be dependent 
on prevailing conditions on the test site. 
 
A major goal of the project is to be able to show that an 
unmanned ship is at least as vigilant as a manned vessel. 
The vigilance of manned systems on ocean passages is 
not optimal, as many ship offices confess in 
conversations face-to-face. It is also reflected in accident 
reports. In 2004 a chemical tanker collided with a fishing 
vessel in the North Sea. The accident investigation report 
summarises: “As a power-driven vessel, Reno, [the 
tanker] was required to keep clear of Ocean Rose [the 
fishing vessel], but did not do so because her OOW had 
left the bridge and gone to his cabin. The AB lookout 
saw Ocean Rose and, realising that she was potentially a 
problem, tried to contact the OOW. He was 
unsuccessful.” [23]. And this was on the North Sea. We 
can expect vigilance to be even lower on the oceans. 
 
Watch keepers are humans and human error is part of the 
human condition and watch keeping on lonely ocean 
passages when other ships might not be seen for days in a 
row will be less than optimal. The automatic watch 
keeping on an unmanned ship is expected to keep the 
same high level at all times. Test will be done to 
determent the limits to what can be detected and 
identified, what needs to be sent to the shore centre for 
identification, and what will remain unseen. A crucial 
point for the project will be to show that no castaway 
floating on a piece of debris is left unspotted in the open 
sea. (And then another problem will arise: how can an 
unmanned ship come to help?) 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The goal of the MUNIN project is not only to show the 
technical feasibility of unmanned vessels, but also to 
show that an unmanned system is at least as safe as a 
manned system.  
 
To say that an autonomous system will remove human 
error as a cause of accidents is to grossly misunderstand 
the complexity and human involvement also in 
autonomous systems.   
 
Technical breakdowns will probably play a big role in 
the beginning, as in most new systems, but can be 
expected to be overcome as experience is gained. Human 
error will continue to be the biggest challenge and must 
be addressed carefully and melodiously. 
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